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Introduction
Dramatic events involving dangerous microbes often
focus attention on isolation and quarantine as policy
instruments. The incident in May-June 2007 involv-
ing Andrew Speaker and drug-resistant tuberculosis
(TB) joins other communicable disease crises that
have forced contemplation or actual application of
quarantine powers. Implementation of quarantine
powers, which encompasses authority for both isola-
tion and quarantine actions, is important not only for
the handling of a specific event but also because the
use of such authority provides a window on broader
issues of public health and the legal rules, ethical
principles, and governance systems that support it.
Debates about quarantine powers reflect political and
social attitudes about public health that often tell us
more about this policy endeavor than acts of isolation
and quarantine themselves.
This article uses the Speaker incident to explore
how isolation and quarantine authority provides a
lens through which to assess public health commit-
ments, competencies, and capabilities. We describe the
Speaker incident itself, which played out in national
and global media in revealing and disturbing ways.
Much of the controversy focused on the application of
federal quarantine powers, so the incident connects to
the larger political, governance, and legal issues quar-
antine authority raises. We analyze quarantine powers
by reflecting on some historical manifestations and by
exploring the current state of isolation and quarantine
authority in public health law and ethics in the United
States. The article's final section looks beyond the
question of quarantine powers in the United States
to consider global implications of the Speaker case,
including the challenges of addressing the growing
problem of drug-resistant TB.
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The Andrew Speaker Incident: Background
and Overview
Background to the Speaker Incident: Rise of Concern
about Drug-Resistant TB
For many in the United States, Andrew Speaker's
odyssey represented their first exposure to multi-drug
resistant TB (MDR-TB) and extensively drug-resis-
tant TB (XDR-TB) and the potential need for pub-
lic health officials to exercise quarantine powers to
address these threats. While TB is treatable with the
first-line drugs isoniazid and rifampicin, MDR-TB is
resistant to them.' XDR-TB is also resistant to iso-
niazid and rifampicin, to any fluoroquinolone, and to
at least one of the three injectable second-line drugs:
amikacin, kanamycin, and capreomycin .2
Speaker's situation did not, however, arise in a
vacuum. Public health awareness about the growing
MDR-TB and XDR-TB problems was rising in 2006,
as evidenced by the issuance of a global alert about
XDR-TB by the World Health Organization (WHO).3
This alert came after analysis of new surveillance data
that indicated XDR-TB was a widespread and growing
problem around the world, but particularly in Eastern
Europe, South Africa, and Asia.4 The data on XDR-
TB's prevalence, and the lack of treatment options,
raised the question whether public health authorities
needed to consider compulsory measures, including
isolation, to contain its spread and impact on popula-
tion health.5 This issue was significant enough for the
WHO to issue, in January 2007, guidance on human
rights and involuntary detention as an XDR-TB con-
trol strategy.6 Thus, even before Speaker became a
household name, public health officials were worried
about MDR-TB and XDR-TB and were, in connection
with XDR-TB, anticipating the possible need to exer-
cise quarantine powers against infected persons.
Overview of the Speaker Incident7
In the same month, January 2007, in which the WHO
issued guidance on involuntary detention and XDR-
TB, Andrew Speaker underwent a chest X-ray and CT
scan, which revealed an abnormality in his lungs. His
sputum smear tested, however, negative for TB. In
March 2007, Speaker had a diagnostic bronchoscopy,
tested positive for TB, and was prescribed a standard
regimen of first-line anti-TB drugs. The positive TB
result was confirmed in April, and the Georgia Pub-
lic Health Laboratory (GPHL) began testing Speak-
er's TB isolate for susceptibility. On April 25, Speaker
reported to the Fulton County TB Clinic and advised
it of his plans for traveling overseas in May, and the
clinic asked for the susceptibility testing to be expe-
dited. The next day the GPHL began susceptibility
testing, and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
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Prevention (CDC) received samples for susceptibility
testing on April 27.
Between April 30 and May 9, susceptibility testing
at the GPHL indicated that Speaker had MDR-TB.
On May 10, Speaker, his family, private physician, and
the Fulton County Health Department (FCHD) met
to discuss his MDR-TB infection. At this meeting,
Speaker was told not to undertake his international
travel, scheduled to start on May 14. Also on May 10,
the FCHD began to review legal options for restricting
a patient infected with untreated MDR-TB, and, on
May 10-11, the Georgia Department of Public Health
(GDPH) and the CDC discussed options for restricting
the travel of a person harboring untreated MDR-TB.
On May 11-12, the FCHD attempted to hand-deliver a
written advisory to Speaker concerning his MDT-TB
infection but could not locate him.
Unbeknownst to any public health official, Speaker
had, on May 11, advanced his departure date from May
14 to May 12, and he departed Atlanta for Europe on
May 12. On May 18, the GPDH notified the CDC that
Speaker had traveled internationally, and the CDC
began the effort to locate him in Europe. CDC tests
of samples from Speaker indicated on May 22 that he
had XDR-TB, and, on the same, day, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection initiated a nation-wide border
alert for Speaker based on information provided by
the CDC.
The CDC tracked Speaker down in Rome on May
22 (May 23 in Rome), informed him of the XDR-TB
diagnosis, and told him not to travel on commercial
aircraft because he posed a significant threat to other
people. Speaker indicated to the CDC he would stay in
Rome while the CDC explored options for managing
his infection and transporting him back to the United
States. However, Speaker instead flew to Prague,
Czech Republic on the morning of May 24, and then
flew from Prague to Montreal later that day. On May
24, unable to locate Speaker, the CDC requested that
the U.S. Transportation Security Administration issue
an order to prevent Speaker from boarding any U.S.
bound flight, and the CDC notified the Italian Min-
istry of Health. Also on May 24 (May 25 in Europe),
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) notified the WHO that Speaker's situation
may constitute a public health emergency of interna-
tional concern under the International Health Regu-
lations (2005).
On May 25, Speaker re-entered the United States
from Canada by automobile, and, despite being aware
of the border alert, the border guard allowed Speaker
into the United States. The CDC located Speaker by
cell phone in New York State, ascertained Speaker's
location, and ordered him to drive to Bellevue Hos-
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pital in New York City for clinical evaluation and fed-
erally mandated isolation. Upon arrival at Bellevue
Hospital, the CDC served him a provisional federal
quarantine order - the first such federal order since
1963. Speaker was isolated in a secure ward, where he
underwent clinical evaluation to ascertain the status
of his infection. After interviewing Speaker, the CDC
began the process of contact tracing passengers on
flights taken by Speaker, which required the coopera-
tion of international, federal, state, and local health
authorities.
While under the federal isolation order, Speaker
elected to return to Atlanta on May 28, after which
time his story began to appear in the media. Undis-
puted facts about his case, and diverging positions
aired in the media, gained attention, and generated
controversy about what had happened, what had
gone wrong, and who was to blame. Through his
own resources, Speaker was transferred on May 31
from Atlanta to the National Jewish Medical Center
(NJMC) in Denver for treatment of his XDR-TB. The
Media attention was drawn back to the case when
tort litigation against Speaker was initiated in Mon-
treal in mid-July by passengers who traveled with him
from Prague to Montreal. Speaker had surgery at the
end of July 2007 to remove a portion of a lung infected
with the MDR-TB, and, after the surgery, he was
declared non-contagious and released from the NJMC
on July 26, after which he flew home to Atlanta.
Quarantine in History: More than
a Medical Matter
Recitation of key facts in the Speaker case does not,
however, capture the emotions, controversies, and
accusations it generated. The believed presence of
XDR-TB, the scope of the international travel, the
behavior and claims of the infected individual, the
reactions of public health authorities, the failure of
border control mechanisms, and the utilization of
federal quarantine powers combined to heighten the
significance of this incident for every level of public
health policy and practice.
Although the application of federal public health authority does not exhaust
the complexities of Speaker's case, the use of federal quarantine power became this
incident's gravitational pull in terms of attention and controversy. The exercise
of such authority became important not only in its own right but also because
it highlighted issues confronting public health that deserve greater attention.
The exercise of quarantine power in the Speaker case became a looking glass
for examining public health law, ethics, and governance in the early 21st century.
CDC rescinded the federal isolation order on June 2
when the Denver County Health Department placed
Speaker under its isolation order.
Controversy about Speaker's case continued after
his transfer to Denver because his statements did not
mirror the facts presented in the CDC briefings. These
divergent positions were aired in hearings Congress
held on June 6, at which CDC Director Dr. Julie Ger-
berding and Speaker (via telephone) testified. Contro-
versy about the Speaker incident flared again when the
NJMC and CDC announced on July 3, after the results
of further tests, that Speaker did not have XDR-TB
but MDR-TB. This announcement gave Speaker the
opportunity to continue his criticism of the CDC. It
also required the CDC to explain why the new diagno-
sis would not have changed actions vis-h-vis Speaker
because of the danger untreated MDR-TB poses to
public health, especially with respect to long-distance
air travel.
For many, the exercise of federal quarantine pow-
ers was the development that brought all the elements
of the episode into focus and generated questions for
individuals, public health officials, and governments.
Although the application of federal public health
authority does not exhaust the complexities of Speak-
er's case, the use of federal quarantine power became
this incident's gravitational pull in terms of attention
and controversy. The exercise of such authority became
important not only in its own right but also because
it highlighted issues confronting public health that
deserve greater attention. The exercise of quarantine
power in the Speaker case became a looking glass for
examining public health law, ethics, and governance
in the early 21st century.
The idea that involuntary detention for public
health purposes reflects political and social phenom-
ena beyond breaking the chain of pathogen transmis-
sion is, of course, not new. One common response to
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epidemics, across time and national boundaries, has
been the use of individual and group control mea-
sures." If we look at isolation and quarantine actions
as part of the progression of an epidemic, we can
detect impulses that often help shape it. These include
the following: (1) avoiding the ill, or those perceived to
be ill, particularly if the disease is thought to be conta-
gious; (2) negotiations over how experts and the com-
munity at large understand the disease, especially in
terms of cause, prevention, and amelioration; (3) the
complex political, economic, and social battles that
guide or obstruct a community's efforts to respond to
the epidemic; and (4) the extent to which ethnicity
and perceptions about a social group associated with
a disease frame the responses that shape control mea-
sures aimed at individuals or communities.
Many societies have responded to visitations of
contagious diseases by avoiding and isolating the ill.
The Old Testament records involuntary detention and
social distancing and their corresponding sanitary
procedures, 9 including the use of the ram's horn or
shofar, traditionally sounded during the Jewish High
Holidays, to signal a case of diphtheria or other conta-
gious disease in the community. In ancient Greece, the
writings of Thucydides (c. 460-c. 400 B.C.) and Hip-
pocrates (c. 460-c. 370 B.C.) demonstrated that Greek
societies attempted to avoid contact with the conta-
gious. 10 The Roman authority on medicine, Galen of
Pergamon, warned that specific diseases made it "dan-
gerous to associate with those afflicted.", In A.D. 549,
the Byzantine emperor Justinian enacted one of the
first laws requiring restraint and isolation of travel-
ers from regions where the plague was known to be
raging. Similar forms of detention for plague directed
against sailors and foreign travelers were also prac-
ticed in seventh-century China and other parts of Asia
and Europe during the Middle Ages. Not surprisingly,
these quarantine actions recognized the relationship
between epidemic disease transmission and human
movement and migration.12
The word quarantine originates from the Italian
words quarantenara and quaranta giorni, which
referred to the 40-day period during which Venice
isolated ships before their goods, crew, and passengers
could disembark during the plague-ridden days of the
14th and 15th centuries. In about 1374, Venice enacted
its 40-day quarantine regulation, and, in 1403, the
municipality established the first maritime quarantine
station, or lazaretto, on the island of Santa Maria di
Nazareth. From medieval times on, shutting the gates
of a city or port to those suspected of being ill, and
isolating sick people within, represented the best, and
often the only, means for stemming an epidemic.
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The growth of international commerce and travel
during the Renaissance and the subsequent three cen-
turies contributed to the spread of infectious diseases
around the globe. To prevent the entry of contagion,
sanitary cordons (literally a ring of armed soldiers
guarding against entry of diseased persons) and quar-
antines were used in France, Britain, Austria, Ger-
man, Russia, and other European and Asian nations
from the 14th through 19th centuries.13 By the mid-
1800s, in response to devastating cholera and plague
epidemics imported into Europe from Turkey and
Egypt, and the economic burdens created by different
national quarantine systems, European nations with
the strongest commercial or colonial interests began
to engage in international cooperation.14 These efforts
included attempts to harmonize quarantine policies,
a process aided by the emergence of the germ theory
of disease in the late 19th century. 5 Commencing in
1851, these International Sanitary Conferences con-
tinued well into the 20th century,16 generated the first
uses of international law for public health purposes,
and led to the creation of the first international health
organizations.17
The history of quarantine, including attempts to
harmonize its application, demonstrates that quaran-
tine has had different meanings to different peoples.
The interdependence of the medical understanding of
contagious diseases and social control measures seems
intuitive, but past epidemics suggest a more complex
interaction of medical knowledge and the actual prac-
tices of disease control, revealing in the application of
isolation and quarantine a complex mixture of scien-
tific, political, economic, and social factors. This mix-
ture reveals much about the way a society constructs
its responses to infectious diseases and thus makes
isolation and quarantine measures a reflection of a
community's make-up and evolution.
During the first half of the 19th century in the
United States, for example, the notion that a microbe
might cause an epidemic was not widely accepted by
medical experts or the public. Anti-contagionists held
that changes in the atmosphere and environmental
sources of filth (e.g., human and animal waste) caused
diseases. Under this view, the "cure" was cleaning up
the environment. The anti-contagionist perspective
conveniently supported the opposition of merchants
and traders to the burdens national quarantine sys-
tems imposed on commerce. Similarly, some countries
favoring the theory of contagion and the practice of
quarantine worried about the growth of the economic
and political power of nations, such as Great Britain,
seeking to pare back the impact of national quarantine
policies on their international economic activities.
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Medical and economic dogma and political inter-
ests were not, however, always anti-quarantine. Sci-
entific doctrine and economic attitudes proved more
flexible in practice than in theory. Isolation and quar-
antine measures were often mounted by governments
that did not subscribe to the germ theory of disease
and that supported trade expansion. Epidemics of yel-
low fever in the United States during the late 18th and
early 19th centuries - a period of devout anti-conta-
gionism among medical professionals - often inspired
some quarantine regulations.
When studying the history of social control mea-
sures as responses to epidemics in the United States
over the past two centuries, a strong leitmotif is the
use of such measures as a medical rationale to isolate
and stigmatize groups reviled for other reasons. David
Musto asserts that isolation and quarantine actions
constitute more than the mere "marking off or creation
of a boundary to ward off a feared biological contami-
nant lest it penetrate a healthy population" because
one cannot consider quarantine as merely disease con-
trol without minimizing the "deeper emotional and
broadly aggressive character" of a policy that separates
persons from the community.' The blame, stigma,
and ostracism associated with isolation and quaran-
tine are especially real for diseases linked to the poor,
aliens, or the disenfranchised: "When an epidemic ill-
ness hits hardest at the lowest social classes or other
fringe groups, it provides that grain of sand on which
the pearl of moralism can form."'19
Quarantine Governance and Public Health
Law and Ethics
The manner in which quarantine powers have been
intertwined with religious, political, economic, and
social practices, interests, values, and prejudices
makes quarantine authority an important governance
topic. Isolation and quarantine involve the compul-
sory application of public authority to individuals or
groups and, thus, these acts create tensions between
protecting population health and respecting indi-
vidual autonomy and dignity. These tensions stimu-
late the heightened interest isolation and quarantine
trigger, as seen in Speaker's case. Principles in public
health law and ethics shape the governance task of
managing those tensions, and these principles provide
insight into how societies organize and perceive the
use of the power to implement isolation and quaran-
tine measures.
Isolation and Quarantine Distinguished and Defined
From a governance perspective, delineation of the dif-
ferent facets of a government's quarantine powers is
important legally and ethically. These powers encom-
pass the authority to detain persons involuntarily for
public health purposes. Although isolation and quar-
antine are often used interchangeably, they are not the
same. Quarantine involves the restriction of the move-
ment of persons who have been exposed, or potentially
exposed, to infectious disease, during the period of
communicability, to prevent transmission of infection
during the incubation period.20 Quarantine seeks to
prevent the spread of dangerous, highly contagious
pathogens, such as smallpox, plague, and Ebola fever,
particularly if medical countermeasures are ineffec-
tive or unavailable.
Isolation involves separating, for the period of com-
municability, known infected persons from the com-
munity so as to prevent or limit the transmission of the
infectious agent.21 Modern science and medicine can
usually detect whether a person has an infectious con-
dition. Accordingly, isolation often is the action taken
rather than quarantine, and this outcome is particu-
larly true for TB. Isolation is, where possible, linked to
treatment, including directly observed therapy (DOT)
for TB, which the detaining authority offers to, or
imposes on, persons subject to isolation orders.22
Jurisdictional Complexities Involving Isolation and
Quarantine Actions
Public health authorities possess a variety of powers
to restrict the autonomy or liberty of persons who
pose a public health threat because they are infected
with, or have been exposed to, dangerous, contagious
pathogens. These authorities can direct individuals
to discontinue risk behaviors (e.g., "cease and desist"
orders), compel them to submit to physical examina-
tion or treatment, and detain them using public health
or criminal justice powers. 23
Legal authority to exercise these powers in the
United States can be found at local, state, and federal
levels. These jurisdictional levels generate federal-
ism questions: what level of government may apply
which rules in what situations? Answers to these ques-
tions depend on the origin and extent of the public
health threat. Local and state laws apply if the threat
is confined to a city, county, or state. If the threat is
imported from a foreign country, or if the pathogen is
being transmitted across state lines, then federal law
applies.
When it comes to the exercise of isolation and quar-
antine powers, reality tends to be messier than the
conceptual realm. Public health officials need clear
lines of authority in emergency situations, often the
moments when isolation and quarantine measures
might be required. Unfortunately, confusion about
which level of government should take the lead often
occurs, thus revealing the ability of quarantine pow-
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ers to spotlight difficulties federalism poses for pub-
lic health. The Speaker case illustrates the complexi-
ties federalism presents because the episode involved
local, state, and federal authorities in the effort to try
to ensure that Speaker did not pose a public health
threat.
State Authority for Isolation and Quarantine
State governments derive isolation and quarantine
authority within their borders from the police power,24
and all states have such powers, although actual laws
vary significantly. In many cases, disparate legal
regimes pose no problem for the exercise of quaran-
tine powers, but lack of uniformity can adversely affect
coordination between local, state, and federal officials.
Typically, public health detention powers are found in
laws that address sexually transmitted diseases, 25TB,26
and other communicable diseases .27When a novel
disease emerges, states sometimes find they lack legal
power to act, as occurred with severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS), because their laws have not
expressly authorized action for the emerging threat . 2
This problem has highlighted how many state laws on
isolation and quarantine are antiquated scientifically
and in their protection of civil liberties.29 The need to
consider the exercise of quarantine powers more seri-
ously has exposed aspects of the relationship between
law and public health, particularly its neglect.
Recent threats have, however, forced state govern-
ments to review their quarantine powers. President
Bush stressed, for example, the need for states to ana-
lyze their isolation and quarantine laws as a homeland
security priority.30 The review process has included
nearly 40 states adopting, in whole or in part, the
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (Model
Act), which was drafted after the anthrax attacks in
2001 in order to provide states with a tool with which
to assess their legal preparedness for public health
emergencies. A controversial aspect of the Model Act
centered on its compulsory powers provisions, which
revealed the power of isolation and quarantine mea-
sures to concentrate political and legal attention on
public health challenges. The importance of the legal
review and reform processes has been underscored
since 2001 through events such as the SARS outbreak
and legal preparedness activities related to pandemic
influenza. The imposition of an isolation order on
Speaker has again stimulated states to scrutinize their
isolation and quarantine laws.
FederalAuthorityfor Isolation and Quarantine
Questions about isolation and quarantine measures
also reveal substantive and procedural problems in
federal law. The federal government's isolation and
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quarantine authorities are contained in the Public
Health Service Act,31 which grants the Secretary of
DHHS authority to make and enforce regulations to
prevent the introduction, transmission, or interstate
spread of communicable diseases into or within the
United States and to apprehend, detain, or condition-
ally release individuals infected with "quarantinable
diseases" specified by executive order. 2 The president
has, to date, identified cholera, diphtheria, infectious
TB, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic
fevers (e.g., Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Crimean-Congo,
South American), SARS, and pandemic influenza
as quarantinable diseases under federal law.33 The
federal government can enforce isolation and quar-
antine measures by criminal sanctions or judicial
injunction. 34
The Speaker case exposed problems with federal
isolation and quarantine authorities. For example,
federal powers apply to a specific list of diseases, thus
depriving the federal government of flexibility when
responding to novel threats. The listing approach
requires the president, for each new threat, to make
the disease quarantinable through executive order,
which is what transpired when SARS and fears of
pandemic influenza emerged. Federal law also fails
to authorize the federal government to use a range
of measures, including individual screening, con-
tact tracing, and DOT, all of which may be useful in
dealing with disease threats, including MDR-TB and
XDR-TB. Finally, federal law does not include appro-
priate due process protections because it does not give
individuals subject to isolation or quarantine orders
a right to a fair hearing. The Constitution requires an
impartial hearing for persons under civil confinement
or detention, 35 including those infected with TB. 36
Current federal quarantine authority is, therefore,
arguably unconstitutional.
Constitutional and Judicial Review of Isolation and
Quarantine Actions
The Constitution does not mention isolation or quar-
antine. However, in discussing imports and exports, it
recognizes the right of states to execute inspection laws,
which are incident to the exercise of quarantine pow-
ers.3 7 In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall suggested that
states have authority to quarantine under their police
powers.3 Since Marshall's time, courts have upheld
the exercise of compulsory detention powers for pub-
lic health purposes. 39 This jurisprudence reveals def-
erence by the courts, which usually regarded isolation
or quarantine actions as presumptively valid. Judicial
activity in U.S. public health has primarily been driven
by challenges mounted against the exercise of quaran-
tine powers during epidemics, notably TB.40
SYMPOSIUM
In these cases, the judiciary asserted some control
over isolation and quarantine measures. Following
the "rule of reasonableness" established in Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, courts insisted that use of quaran-
tine powers be justified by "public necessity," and that
states may not act "arbitrarily" or "unreasonably.' 1
Courts have also set four limits on isolation and quar-
antine authority:
1. The Subject Must Be Actually Infectious or Have
Been Exposed to Infectious Disease. Health authori-
ties must demonstrate that individuals are infected or
were exposed to disease and, thus, pose a public health
risk.42 Courts have been reluctant to stigmatize citi-
zens in the absence of reasonable proof.43 Thus, isola-
tion of persons with TB must demonstrate that they
are infectious, or would be infectious if they stopped
taking their medication.
2. Safe and Habitable Conditions. Courts periodi-
cally insisted on safe and healthful environments for
those subject to isolation or quarantine because pub-
lic health powers are designed to promote well-being,
and not to punish. 44 The Supreme Court held, for
example, that civilly committed mental patients have
a right to "conditions of reasonable care and safety,"
"freedom from bodily restraint," and "adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care.
" 4 5
This requirement is germane to the case of Rob-
ert Daniels, an XDR-TB patient who has been com-
pulsorily isolated in the "jail" section of a hospital in
Maricopa County, Arizona. The American Civil Lib-
erties Union filed suit arguing that Maricopa County
denied Daniels constitutionally required habitable
conditions because he is regularly stripped searched,
not allowed to exercise or go outside, and denied basic
amenities such as regular visits and access to a tele-
phone.46 While this lawsuit was pending, Maricopa
County transferred Daniels to NJMC, where Speaker
was being treated.
3. Justice and Non-Discrimination. A federal court
struck down one of the most invidious measures in
public health history in Jew Ho v. Williamson At
the turn of the 20th century, public health officials
quarantined an entire district of San Francisco, osten-
sibly to contain an epidemic of bubonic plague, but
the quarantine operated exclusively against the Chi-
nese community. The federal court held the quaran-
tine unconstitutional because health authorities acted
with an "evil eye and an unequal hand "'48 Jew Ho forms
part of the leitmotif noted earlier - that governments
are sometimes tempted to use their quarantine pow-
ers as an instrument of prejudice against vulnerable
individuals or populations. 49 This theme informed
controversies that arose during MDR-TB outbreaks in
the 1990s when New York and other cities targeted the
mentally ill, drug addicts, and homeless persons for
DOT, while affluent groups were spared.50
The Supreme Court has described civil commitment
as a "massive curtailment of liberty. 51 Although civil
commitment cases often concern the mentally ill, the
principles these cases enunciate also apply to isolation
and quarantine measures. As one court explained in
the context of TB, "[lInvoluntary commitment for
having communicable tuberculosis impinges on the
right to liberty, full and complete liberty, no less than
involuntary commitment for being mentally ill."52
Some courts have required actual danger to the pub-
lic as a condition of civil confinement in both mental
health53 and infectious disease 54 contexts. For example,
in the case of In re City of New York v. Doe, the court
required clear and convincing evidence of the person's
inability to complete a course of TB medication before
permitting compulsory restraint.55
Given the strict standard of review, courts could
require the government to demonstrate that there
are no less restrictive alternatives to achieve the pub-
lic health objective.56 The government might have to
offer, for example, DOT as a less restrictive alterna-
tive to isolation. However, the government does not
have to go to extreme, or unduly expensive, means to
avoid confinement 57 because the judiciary is not likely
to require the state to provide economic incentives
and benefits to induce compliance. In the TB context,
New York City health officials argued that they could
not be required "to exhaust a pre-set, rigid hierarchy
of alternatives that would ostensibly encourage volun-
tary compliance.. .regardless of the potentially adverse
consequences to the public health."58
4. Procedural Due Process. Persons subject to deten-
tion are entitled to procedural due process. As the
Supreme Court recognized, "[T]here can be no doubt
that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital,
like involuntary confinement of an individual for any
reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State can-
not accomplish without due process of law:'59 The pro-
cedures required depend on the nature and duration
of the restraint.60 Certainly, the government must pro-
vide elaborate due process for long-term, non-emer-
gency, detention. 61 Noting that "civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty,"62 and that commitment "can engender
adverse social consequences;' the Supreme Court has
held that, in a civil commitment hearing, the govern-
ment has the burden of proof by "clear and convincing
evidence "63
In Greene v. Edwards, the West Virginia Supreme
Court held that persons with infectious TB are enti-
tled to similar procedural protections as persons with
mental illness facing civil commitment. 64 These safe-
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guards include the right to counsel, a hearing, and an
appeal. The invasion of liberty occasioned by deten-
tion, the implications of erroneously finding a person
dangerous to the public's health, and the value of pro-
cedures in determining complex facts justify rigorous
procedural protections.
The limits courts have placed on government use
of isolation and quarantine reflect not only the threat
posed by pathogenic microbes but also the rule of
adapt and respond more rapidly to novel threats. This
empowerment has the corresponding effect, under the
rule of law, of heightening scrutiny of how the federal
government exercises such broader powers.
2. Due Process. The proposed regulations empower
federal public health officers to quarantine ill passen-
gers provisionally for up to three business days. There-
after, officers can order full quarantine on grounds of a
reasonable belief that a person or group is in the quali-
Civil libertarians draw attention to the substantial personal interests affected
by isolation and quarantine actions. Individuals subjected to confinement lose
their liberty, suffer invasions of individual rights (including loss of privacy),
face stigma because their community is aware of the infectious danger
they pose, may have their bodily integrity compromised because of compulsory
treatment, and endure socio-economic burdens such as the loss of
income during their detention, and possibly thereafter.
law. Whether and how isolation and quarantine are
applied reveals aspects of politics, economics, and cul-
tures in many societies. The relationship of quarantine
powers to the rule of law is similarly instructive about
governance strategies to balance individual rights and
the public good. Jurisprudence on isolation and quar-
antine reveals a way of thinking about how political
power should be, at each step, subject to legal rules
and procedures.
Revising Federal Law: The Proposed New Federal
Quarantine Regulations
Having effective public health powers operating within
the rule of law encourages constant re-evaluation of
legal rules and procedures, and the exercise of quar-
antine powers provides a powerful way to stimulate
interest in such re-assessment. In keeping with this
dynamic, and recognizing the problems with existing
federal quarantine powers, the DHHS proposed new
regulations in 2005,65 which provide another oppor-
tunity to evaluate how quarantine powers can protect
public health within the rule of law.
1. Scope of Federal Power. The Public Health Ser-
vice Act authorizes the "apprehension, detention, or
conditional release" of individuals for diseases listed
by executive order. The proposed regulations would
broaden the scope of federal power because they
define "ill person" to include the conditions linked
with quarantinable diseases, such as fever, rash, per-
sistent cough, or diarrhea. This approach embodies an
important shift that allows the federal government to
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fying stage of a quarantinable disease. The length of
quarantine may not exceed the period of incubation
and communicability, which can range from weeks to
months, as in the case of XDR-TB. During quarantine,
officers can offer individuals prophylaxis or treatment,
but a refusal can result in continued deprivation of
liberty.
Under the revised regulations, the federal govern-
ment does not intend to provide individuals with
hearings during provisional quarantine, but individu-
als can request an administrative hearing to contest
a full isolation or quarantine order. Interestingly, the
federal government offered Speaker the right to a
hearing in connection with its isolation order, a right
not found in the federal quarantine regulations (FQR)
that applied to Speaker. It appears as if the federal
government sought guidance on the right to a hearing
from the proposed revisions to the FQR, which sug-
gests recognition of the constitutionally suspect lack
of due process in the existing regulations.
The administrative process in the proposed FQR
includes a hearing that comports with elements of due
process: notice, hearing before a public official, and
right of communication with counsel. Still, deficien-
cies remain: (1) individuals must request a hearing,
which may delay or prevent independent review for
those who do not understand or take the initiative;
(2) the proceedings can be informal, even permitting
hearings based exclusively on written documents; and
(3) the hearing officer may be a federal public health
employee who makes a recommendation to the CDC
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Director. The European Court of Human Rights found
a similar scheme in violation of Article 5 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, which requires a
hearing by a "court."66
As of this writing, the federal government has not
adopted the proposed revisions to the FQR. The pub-
lic health community supported many proposed revi-
sions, but critics worried about invasions of liberty,
privacy, and property that the revised regulations
would arguably produce. Due process experts dis-
liked the lack of any hearing for provisional isolation
or quarantine and the failure to provide more robust
due process for those subject to full isolation or quar-
antine orders. Privacy advocates worried that the pro-
posed regulations would undermine the protection of
an individual's personal and health information. The
travel industry criticized the costs the proposed rules
would impose on it to collect, protect, and transmit
passenger information.
The Speaker case has re-focused attention on the
unadopted revision of the FQR and may, thus, con-
tribute to new efforts by the federal government to
update this fundamental set of federal public health
laws. Whether the Speaker incident proves a power-
ful catalyst for such a significant change remains to be
seen.
The Ethics of Involuntary Detention of
Persons with Infectious TB
Civil libertarians draw attention to the substantial
personal interests affected by isolation and quaran-
tine actions. Individuals subjected to confinement
lose their liberty, suffer invasions of individual rights
(including loss of privacy), face stigma because their
community is aware of the infectious danger they pose,
may have their bodily integrity compromised because
of compulsory treatment, and endure socio-economic
burdens such as the loss of income during their deten-
tion, and possibly thereafter. These issues are impor-
tant individual interests, and state and federal govern-
ments should do all they can to mitigate these harms,
as well as ensure that they exercise quarantine powers
in accordance with the rule of law.
From an ethical perspective, the fact that detention
is a drastic measure does not mean that isolation and
quarantine are inappropriate. Persons with infectious,
or potentially infectious, TB pose a risk to the public.
TB can be spread by airborne droplets among persons
congregated in confined spaces for extended dura-
tions, including long-haul travel in a bus, metro, train,
or plane, as well as in group settings such as mental
institutions, hospitals, nursing homes, and homeless
shelters. Consequently, detention may be ethically
justifiable, and provided that it is necessary, it is used
as a last resort and applied in keeping with notions of
human dignity and natural justice.
Speaker's case is an example of an ethically appro-
priate exercise of isolation powers. He had infectious
TB. Whether his infectious TB was XDR-TB, as previ-
ously thought, or MDR-TB, as eventually diagnosed,
does not change the ethical (or the epidemiological)
analysis. Public health authorities first attempted less
restrictive measures, such as treatment combined with
"no travel" instructions, but twice Speaker did not com-
ply and put the health of others at risk. Further, the
federal government offered Speaker the opportunity
to exercise his right to a hearing, a right guaranteed
by the Constitution if not the existing FQR. In each
location of isolation, Speaker has been detained in
highly therapeutic, humane facilities. Disagreements
about the "facts" of his case 67 do not change these con-
ditions of ethical confinement: a dangerous infectious
condition, less drastic alternatives attempted, proce-
dural due process offered, and humane conditions of
isolation.
In the ethical realm, Speaker's behavior raises
another facet of the dynamics of isolation and quar-
antine in modern societies - the responsibility of indi-
viduals in the increasingly challenging and dangerous
world of public health governance. Isolations of infec-
tious TB patients typically, if not universally, involve
failure of the patients to heed instructions concerning
treatment or interacting with other persons.6 8 Gov-
ernment officials do not today blow the ram's horn
to warn of contagious disease in the community, but
warnings about appropriate individual behavior are
given in ways that trigger ethical, if not legal, respon-
sibilities of citizens to do no harm to others.
Beyond Quarantine: Global Dimensions of
the Speaker Incident and Drug-Resistant
Tuberculosis
Although the exercise of quarantine powers made
the Speaker incident a window on public health eth-
ics, law, and governance, the incident involved other
features that deserve mention. In particular, the
Speaker case was international in scope and impli-
cations, which draws attention to the global dimen-
sions of this incident and the problem of drug-resis-
tant TB. This section considers global facets of the
Speaker case.
The Global Dimensions of U.S. Public Health Law
The Speaker case highlighted issues in U.S. public
health law related to the international aspects of
his travels. Speaker's plans to travel to Europe after
being diagnosed with MDR-TB raised the issue
about which governmental body can prevent a U.S.
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citizen from leaving the United States. Local, state,
and federal public health officials conferred about
ways to prevent Speaker's international travel, but
he had already left the country. While local and state
powers are still relevant, the international context
of foreign travel suggests that the relevant constitu-
tional level of government to prevent persons with
dangerous, contagious pathogens from traveling
internationally from the United States is the federal
government. Federal law presently does not contain
provisions relating to preventing disease exporta-
tion; rather, the focus is on preventing or address-
ing disease importation. 69 Existing statutory law and
the proposed revisions to the FQR do not address the
need to empower the federal government to prevent
persons who pose a public health risk from traveling
outside the country.
A second international issue centered on the fed-
eral government's attempts to convince Speaker to
report to Italian public health authorities after the
CDC made the XDR-TB diagnosis. Did the federal
government have the legal authority to enforce quar-
antine powers on U.S. nationals present in the terri-
tory of other nations? Generally, the federal govern-
ment cannot enforce federal law outside the United
States unless Congress intended for the law in ques-
tion to have such extraterritorial effect,70 and no such
intent can be located in federal public health law. In
fact, Congress prescribed that the FQR shall be appli-
cable only to individuals coming into a state or pos-
session of the United States from a foreign country or
possession.71
The U.S. border guard's failure to detain Speaker
upon his re-entry into the United States, despite the
border guard knowing of the CDC's health alert, has
generated concerns about the inability of U.S. bor-
der control systems to handle public health threats.
These concerns existed prior to the Speaker inci-
dent, as illustrated by an Institute of Medicine study
on the system of quarantine stations at U.S. ports of
entry.72 The study argued that this system "no lon-
ger protect[s] the US population against microbial
threats of public health significance that originate
abroad."73 Improving public health capabilities at
U.S. borders requires improved leadership, laws and
regulations, infrastructure, training, interagency col-
laboration, and funding. How Speaker's re-entry into
the United States was handled indicates both some
progress (e.g., the CDC health alert reached the bor-
der control personnel in time to detain Speaker) and
continuing problems (e.g., Speaker was allowed into
the country without compliance with the health alert)
that require more political commitment and financial
resources from Congress.
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Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis and the New
International Health Regulations
The World Health Assembly adopted the revised
International Health Regulations in May 2005 (IHR
2005),74 and the Speaker incident intersected with this
new international agreement immediately before the
IHR 2005 entered into force on June 15, 2007. The
IHR 2005 appeared in three ways in the Speaker case.
First, the federal isolation order against Speaker con-
nected to ongoing debate about whether compulsory
measures may increasingly be needed to contain the
global spread of XDR-TB. The IHR 2005 acknowl-
edges that isolation and quarantine may be required,
but the regulations oblige States Parties to implement
compulsory measures consistently with scientific,
public health, and human rights principles. In that
regard, the WHO has issued guidance on involuntary
detention for XDR-TB control in light of human rights
norms. 75
Second, although the IHR 2005 was not yet in
force, the United States formally notified the WHO
that the Speaker situation may constitute a public
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)
pursuant to the IHR 2005.76 This action connected
to debates within the WHO about whether XDR-TB
cases could trigger the IHR 2005's notification obli-
gations by being disease events that might constitute
a PHEIC. Prior to the Speaker incident, a WHO task
force asserted that XDR-TB is not a PHEIC because
notification of such an emergency is "only intended
for outbreaks of acute disease, rather than the 'acute-
on-chronic' situation of.. .XDR-TB."77 Alarm about the
XDR-TB problem suggests that this pathogen is dan-
gerous and is of global concern, perhaps creating the
need for State Parties to the IHR 2005 to follow the
U.S. lead in viewing this pathogen within the scope of
the surveillance obligations of the regulations.
Third, CDC Director Julie Gerberding drew atten-
tion to the IHR 2005 in comments to the press about
the Speaker episode. Gerberding stated that the IHR
2005 contained "wonderful statements of principles"
but do not provide "operational details of things like
who should pay to move a patient, or who should care
for a patient."78 She also stated, "I think a central ques-
tion that we will be grappling with is, whose patient
is it?"79
These comments about the IHR 2005 require scru-
tiny. The IHR 2005 was never designed to answer the
kinds of questions Gerberding raised. In addition, the
application of general principles of international law
answers these questions. Under the principle of sov-
ereignty, the country in which a patient is physically
located has primary responsibility for public health
activities and persons within its territory and jurisdic-
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tion. Under the principle of non-intervention in the
domestic affairs of states, the home country of a patient
has no right to intervene in the sovereign affairs of the
host country concerning public health.
These principles mean that, in Speaker's case,
Italy had primary responsibility for public health
vis-a-vis Speaker when he was physically present in
Italy, and that the United States could ask, but not
legally require, that Italy undertake certain actions
regarding Speaker. Absent a specific treaty obliga-
tion, Italy was under no duty to transport Speaker
back to the United States or pay for such transport.
If the United States wanted to transport him home,
then the United States would be responsible for the
costs of such transport. Under international law, no
confusion existed about whose patient Speaker was
while he was in Italy, or what country had to pay to
transport him home.
Easy legal answers do not, of course, produce funds
and capabilities to transport a U.S. citizen thought to
be infected with XDR-TB back to the United States,
particularly when federal agencies had no plans or
resources to execute such an action. Whether and how
to generate such funds and capabilities are, however,
national policy questions not issues of international
law or lacunae in the IHR 2005.
The Global Problem ofDrug-Resistant Tuberculosis
In many ways, Speaker is an atypical victim of infec-
tion by drug-resistant TB. As the statistics about
XDR-TB suggest, the typical XDR-TB patient is not
white, affluent, highly educated, well traveled, and
media savvy. The change in Speaker's diagnosis from
XDR-TB to MDR-TB does not lessen the problems
both forms of drug-resistant TB present to population
health, particularly those in transition and develop-
ing countries with high rates of HIV/AIDS and weak
to non-existent public health systems. The "looking
glass" quarantine powers provide for examining pub-
lic health law, governance, and ethics generates much
less guidance when contemplating how to respond to
the global march of drug-resistant TB. The task list for
altering this trajectory is formidable: improve surveil-
lance for drug-resistant TB; craft better non-pharma-
cological interventions that protect population health
and respect individual rights; develop more accurate
diagnostic technologies to improve the ability to dis-
tinguish MDR-TB from TB and XDR-TB from MDR-
TB; control the synergy between HIV/AIDS and TB
more effectively; invent new antibiotic treatments;
and build health infrastructure capacity to handle
these tasks. How these tasks will be accomplished is
something on which neither the Speaker case nor the
quarantine looking glass provides much insight.
Conclusion
In all likelihood, the Speaker episode will enter the
annals of public health history as a case involving an
incredible set of facts and sequence of events, as well
as deeper implications for public health and the gov-
ernance systems, legal rules, and ethical principles
that support this policy endeavor. This article focused
on how the use of federal quarantine power against
Speaker connects to, and helps illustrate, the ways in
which isolation and quarantine reveal features about
the place of public health in the politics, economics,
cultures, and governance philosophies of societies.
The Speaker case teaches valuable lessons about
challenges public health governance confronts from
the individual to the global level, especially in the con-
text of a pathogen increasingly resistant to the tools
of modern medicine. Speaker's odyssey focused atten-
tion on the threat XDR-TB and MDR-TB present,
but heightened awareness is not a policy response. An
episode at the end of July 2007 involving two persons
infected with drug-resistant TB who ignored instruc-
tions from Taiwanese authorities not to travel and flew
from Taiwan to China anyway80 is a reminder that the
individual, national, and international governance
challenges that Speaker's case highlighted have not
disappeared as his story fades from the front pages.
Speaker's case also provides lessons on the impor-
tance of public health law on isolation and quarantine
because, like the threats ofbioterrorism and pandemic
influenza, this case forced another round of scrutiny of
state, federal, and international legal rules that relate
to compulsory measures. This case emphasizes the
need for the federal government to finalize its pro-
posed revision of the FQR in such a way that the new
regulations provide a stronger basis for federal action
in the future. The trajectory of drug resistance in TB
will, in all likelihood, confront public health officials
with the need to consider compulsory measures for
individuals infected with highly dangerous and conta-
gious pathogens. Public health principles and the rule
of law encourage the crafting of the best possible legal
framework before more threats emerge.
Finally, Speaker's case illustrates the limits of pub-
lic health law and the importance of ethical obliga-
tions in communicable disease contexts permeated
with danger, uncertainty, and fear. Public health's
reliance on voluntary compliance with treatment and
travel instructions involving TB patients depends on
such patients understanding the public health conse-
quences of their behavior. The likelihood of increased
cases of drug-resistant TB only heightens the individ-
ual's ethical role in public health governance.
With respect to public health governance, law, and
ethics, what the quarantine looking glass reveals has
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changed over time. Through this looking glass, we see
how societies cope with transformations in scientific
understandings of pathogenic threats and political
commitments to individual rights. But these changes,
and the historical distance between the first Venetian
lazeretto and Speaker's isolation, do not diminish what
we can learn from the focus quarantine powers bring
to bear on our political, social, and personal under-
standings of population and individual health.
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